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A Strange Love of the Land: Identity,





1 In this paper I shall try to explore how the idea of space in what we call ‘South Asia’ today
got reconfigured by modernity. I shall explore three spatial conceptions of South Asia—
strategic,  geographic  and  cultural;  and  I  shall  try  to  explain  the  patterns  of  space-
thinking  underlying  each  one  of  them,  show  their  connection  with  modernity,  and
discuss why and how South Asia is still not a space that can be conceived as a space of
belonging.  I  shall  run  two  arguments  together—the  first  about  the  historical
transformations  of  identity  in  modern  times,  and  the  second  about  the  poetic
construction of affect for space-related terms like India, and Pakistan, but not South Asia. 
2 Spaces or space-terms are constituted by specific purposes. South Asia emerged in the
1950-60s as an academic-governmental term of American coinage designating a spatial
area of concern for American strategy and foreign policy. This was a typical external
term: i.e. a term by which outsiders designated a territory for purposes significant to
them, but devoid of any affective significance for its inhabitants. In British and European
discourse, this term was relatively rare, or absent. They saw this area as primarily the
space of two states, India and Pakistan, born out of a partition of British colonial India.
But British colonial thinking would not have regarded this event as either surprising, or
as a loss, because of their long-standing belief that nothing held India together from the
inside. It was only the iron frame of the colonial state that made it a single political
entity. 
3 Two political processes of modernity introduce a new kind of space-making—nationalism
and state-formation. Though these two processes are intertwined in the rise of nation-
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states, for analytical purposes it is better to see them as separate. In the paper, I shall
follow some significant points of this dual process of emergence of new state structures in
British colonial India and their animation by various emerging forms of nationalism. A
sequence of nationalist ideologies appeared in this space—in 19th century Bengal, and
eventually  through  the  institution  of  state-nationalisms  of  India,  Pakistan  and
Bangladesh. These state forms and gestalts of affect make it impossible to think of South
Asia seriously as a space of emotional inhabitance. 
4 Yet, despite these state-nationalist borders of consciousness, there still exist long-term
historical  commonalities  which  people  spontaneously  practice  and  enjoy—in  food,
material culture, literature, art, music—which have a deep and long history. This endows
peoples of this region (not states) by common structures of intelligibility, reflected in
their easy commingling when they are outside their countries and free of the pressures of
state nationalism, or gather in artistic public spheres. There is much to be said for a
revival of this pre-modern world of frontiers, where people knew how to live their lives
outside the coercive containers of nation-states, which unsuccessfully mimic forms of
European modernity. 
5 My primary argument will be that there are two ways of thinking about identities and
connections. The first evolved through long gestation in pre-modern history. This pre-
modern practice of identity was entirely exploded by modern political conditions and
replaced by identities constructed by the boundaries of modern states; but paradoxically,
these modern identities are politically more powerful yet historically more fragile. With
the slow decline in the legitimacy of state-produced identities, I think we can see the
persistence  of  the  pre-modern  identity  of  graded  connections.  Since  modernity
reconstitutes both individual and collective identities, it might be useful to start with a




6 In his work on identity and violence, Amartya Sen (2006) states that individuals have
many identities; but that conflicts arise when some decide to ‘absolutize’ one of their
identities over others. I agree with the political direction of Sen’s argument; but I would
suggest a somewhat different way of conceiving personal identity. It is better to put it in a
different  way—an individual  does  not  have  many  identities;  rather  each  individual’s
identity is complex. My identity is constituted by the combination of characteristics or
attributes which individuates me, singularizes me against all other individuals. Of course
this  identity of  mine is  a  combination of  many features—which I  would call  identity-
attributes. So my identity is constructed out of attributes like being male, Indian, Bengali,
non-religious,  a  supporter  of  the  left  in  politics,  of  Brazil  in  soccer,  an  admirer  of
particular types of paintings, poetry, music and many other things. All are my qualities as
an  individual;  but  these  qualities  fall  into  at  least  two  categories;  some  are  strictly
individual like my taste in clothes, or my bodily features, but there are some like ‘being a
Hindu/Muslim’  or a Labor Party supporter—which I  can bear only because there are
collective groups bearing those names. Though I can be the only living individual who
loves  chilly  flavored  chocolates,  for  me  to  be  a  Jew,  a  collective  body—a  Jewish
community—must  exist.  I call  these  characteristics  identity-attributes,  rather  than
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identity, because I believe there is another aspect to personal identity that is of equal
conceptual significance. I have an identity-function—a capacity to select, emphasize and
mobilize into appropriate social acts the congeries of attributes that I possess at any point
in time. It goes without saying that these attributes can increase or decrease in number,
or intensity. An individual’s identity function or what I could call the identity-verb can
foreground and fade selectively different attributes in his/her social life. To say I have
many identities is confusing; this elementary distinction between attributes and function
allows us to save the correct  intuition behind Sen’s  argument.  Personal  identity is  a
fascinating subject in itself; but I do not want to pursue that theme here. 
 
Collective identity
7 I have argued for some time that modernity deeply affects collective identities: it is not
that collective identities did not exist in pre-modern times; but the character of collective
identities changes as a result of two characteristically modern processes (Kaviraj 2010).
The first of these are the distinctive cognitive apparatuses of modern societies; and the
second are the peculiar features of modern state-power. This argument is misunderstood
at times. Some suggested that I claimed pre-modern people had no collective identities,
or did not have techniques for large counting. My argument was different. In pre-modern
times states existed but they lacked both the incentives and the cognitive apparatuses to
produce large  projects  of  counting—like  the  modern census  and territorial  mapping.
More significantly, the production of knowledge regarding spaces and populations seeped
into ordinary people’s consciousness and everyday political conduct in modern times.
Some people may be innumerate, but they would know of the existence of majorities and
minorities,  and more crucially,  they would know about  how to  do politics  with this
knowledge. People do not need to possess the techniques of counting to be affected in
their  political  and  social  lives  by  the  consequences  of  political  counting.  Two other
supplementary  arguments  were  involved  in  the  discussion.  In  pre-modern  contexts,
social agents would stress different attributes of their social selves context-dependently.
In  given  contexts  an  individual  might  emphasize  his  identity  as  carpenter,  or  as  a
Bengali-speaker, or as a Vaisnava; and rarely would his inclusion in a particular political
principality constitute a highly significant part of his identity. At least, it would not be
the case that he would place this identity above all else— producing an inflexible ranking
of his identity attributes and placing his state-citizenship at the top. Associated with this
was another suggestion that some modern cultural  processes—like the rise of  print—
produced a deep standardizing and homogenizing effect—erasing gradually a world of
frontiers and replacing it by a world of linear boundaries. It can be pointed out, correctly,
that a pre-modern world of frontiers, less categorical conceptions of political identity still
lurks in the interstices of the social world; but there can be no doubt that the modern
categorical identity produced by processes of enumeration enjoys a dominance in modern
times. Large identities like the Muslim umma— the worldwide religious community of
Muslims, or the Persianate literary culture inhabited by Persian, Indian and Central Asian
literati, or sectarian identities like Vaisnavas or Saivas—of course existed in pre-modern
times and were entirely intelligible to their inhabitants, but the main suggestion was that
the  enumeration processes  initiated by  the  modern state  converted them into  more
‘objectified’  identity groups.  Bernard  Cohn  (1996)  suggested  that  this  objectification
meant fixing them permanently and clearly in the minds of their members; my concerns
were more political. I stressed the fact that these identities became comprehensive, abstract
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and  agentive.  It  became  increasingly  possible  to  conceive  of  these  identities  as
comprehensive: when there was talk of Muslims, it more seriously included in its ambit
literally all Muslims, not a local, specific, or contextually delimited group. Obviously, such
comprehensive communities needed to be abstract in the specific sense in which Benedict
Anderson  (1991)  spoke  of  nations  as  imagined  communities.  The  most  significant
consideration for an understanding of politics is their agentive character. They designated
not groups of people who could fall under some specific description, but groups which
putatively acted as single collective actors. Under this altered optics of belonging, agency
and responsibility, it becomes possible to be fluent in the deadly languages of modern
hatred. Muslims are seen to have destroyed the towers at the World Trade Centre, in
retaliation for indignities that Americans had heaped on the populations of the Middle
East. It is pointless to show that this language uses an improbably expanded notion of
political agency and moral responsibility, or that it does not allow for a slope of agency
and  culpability  inside  the  hateful  collectivities.  It  is  the  powerful,  easy,  incendiary,
contagious  prose  of  global  politics;  and  it  is  a  typical  product  of  the  cognitive,




8 In this outline of historical change one highly significant element is missing. In this form,
the story appears to be entirely one of explicit or subtle coercion—by states or elites who
capture and control political power. But this is misleading: the power of elites, at least in
the colonial and postcolonial historical worlds, is not simply the power of coercion. In
colonial times, power is not in an unfragmented way in their hands. They certainly wield
power in society, especially in non-political sectors of social life, and in cultural spheres;
but overt institutional political power is not in their control. Indigenous elites certainly
absorb and deploy what Charles Taylor (2003) has called an entire range of ‘modern social
imaginaries’. In colonial historical contexts in particular it is crucial to remember that
political power of the indigenous elites is initially constituted through the formation of a
nationalist imaginary rather than institutional power of the state. It is the emergence of
the ideal of modern nationalism that produces the strange love of the land that marks
modern political discourse, and creates an entirely unprecedented connection between
fixed political space and a powerful emotion of inhabitance. Poetry invariably plays a
critical role in creation of this affect, reflected in the urge of all modern states to set their
pretensions to glory to music in the national anthem. I shall now turn to the history of
the creation of this unprecedented and quite unnatural emotion in colonial India. Despite
the apparent naturalness of the uplifting gestures by athletes on the Olympic podium, of
soldiers saluting their flags, and the ubiquitous display of this emotion in public stages,
historically there was nothing ‘natural’ about the emotion that attaches people to space. 
9 It follows from my previous argument that this emotion of attachment to a state could
not arise in pre-modern conditions. States were often in control of spatially immense
empires;  but  their  territories  were  not  sufficiently  stable  to  even propose,  let  alone
effectively  create,  this  kind  of  emotional  connection.  Empire  states,  which were  the
common form of political organization before the European invention of the nation-state,
simply could not produce a comparable emotion. Yet there were other conceptions of
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spaces  and  communities  of  people  that  were  available  for  patterns  of  social  action.
Despite  sharp  sectarian  divides,  Hindu  communities  shared  texts,  styles  of  religious
observance, pilgrimage circuits, which defined a recognizable space for them. Clearly,
Muslim communities conceived of various kinds of shared spaces. They recognized an
abstract  Muslim  world  community  confirmed  by  arrangements  for haj  pilgrimages
supported by Islamic rulers,  like the Mughals.  Also the travels of individuals like Ibn
Battuta (1304-1337) evidently showed they had a clear conception of an Islamicate world
that stretched from North Africa to Java. We can find a sense of a similar ‘world’ in the
sociological reflections of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). A Persianate cosmopolis flourished till
the 18th century spanning Persia, Central Asia and North India through which authors,
works and political adventurers travelled freely in search of fortune. This could not have
happened if the relevant agents and social groups did not regard these as recognizable
spaces  where  they  expected  to  be  understood,  appreciated  and  welcomed.  But  the
effective verb for their relationship with those spaces would be ‘to know’ rather than ‘to
own’. Besides, the knownness of the spaces was related to specific functions or purposes.
Sufi religious figures often travelled from Persia or Khorasan to settle down in India.
Afghan military groups were involved in political warfare down to the times chronicled in
the Seir Mutaqherin in the 18th century (see 2006 edition). There is however a fundamental
difference  between  familiarity  and  ownership.  Several  features  of  this  world  are
noteworthy for our analysis of spatial history. First,  the spatial conceptions/pictures/
images were frontiered, not bordered. One region of literary style or political control
ended and another began rather approximately and tentatively; not like modern frontiers
in linear boundaries across a map of objectified space. Bernier (2011 [1672]) records in his
Travels his surprise at meeting ambassadors from the imperial Chinese court who were
utterly vague about the precise limits of their empire and that of the Mughals. Second,
this was itself partly due to the instability of political control over territory. By the fickle
fortune of military conquests, territories of imperial states expanded and contracted like
a concertina in very short periods. This instability denied the rulers the opportunity to
establish a  firmly common culture;  and to the populace the time to develop intense
political loyalty. In any case, the nature of pre-modern political authority precluded the
possibility that people would regard this loyalty as a loyalty to their collective self—the
crucial element in nationalist thinking. Ordinary communities in agricultural societies
learnt the fine art of living with their heads down to allow the storms of political strife to
pass overhead with minimal damage. Basically, the conditions of political life simply did
not allow the kind of  stable connection between bounded territories and identifiable
sedentary populations required for the development of the poetry of spatial affection.
Finally,  and  critically,  the  boundaries  of  spaces  were  not  so  final  and  impermeable.
Boundaries of different types of spaces did not coincide—the spaces of culture, economic
activity,  political  control,  educational  styles  were  not  the  same  as  the  boundary  of
political  power.  Spaces of different activities were differently configured. Pre-modern
political regimes did not produce the decisive container effect of modern sovereign states.
Whatever is a significant form of social activity today, it is bounded by the borders of the
sovereign  state.  Before  modernity,  societies  lived  in  a  fundamentally  different
configuration of spatial structures. An ancillary effect of this re-arrangement was the
slow acknowledgement—not always without resentment and dissatisfaction—of the role
of the state as the ultimate producer of rules and disciplines for all fields of social life.
Emergence of sovereign states did not merely alter the nature of relations between states
in the international arena; it was the most significant alteration of the relation between
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political power and the ‘internal’ spheres of social activities of all kinds. Consequently,
the definition of politics changed: instead of being diverse patterns of activities by which
rulers  sought  to  keep  and  expand  their  power,  and  equally  diverse  ways  in  which
ordinary people tried to cope with their exactions, it slowly turned into the name of the
activity that dealt with a restructured form of power—with much tighter conceptions of
the relations between the rulers and the ruled—keeping this container as an inescapable
part of the furniture of social existence. The pre-modern configuration of non-coincident
structures of  space—whether the space of  cultural  connection,  or of  religious life,  or
economic or commercial regionality—passed irreversibly. In terms of the lives of ordinary




10 We tend to forget that living is a partly lyrical activity. It takes imagination to inhabit a
space, not just a material submission to its brute-fact features. There is usually a subtle
connection  between  the  language  of  material  necessity  and  the  language  of  lyrical
emotion: we should not forget again that the refinements of poetry become possible by
working  on  distinctions  that  really  exist.  The  Eskimos  are  said  to  have  thirty-one
different words for various kinds of snow. I realized only after coming to live in England
why the English language had so many words for what we in our unrefined tropical
language simply called brishti (rain). Given the historical conditions of pre-modernity it is
not surprising that there were no anthems to the Mughal Empire, or a song celebrating
the Persianate literary sphere, or a military tune taking pride in the very mixed soldiery
of the Mughal or Sikh rulers. Soldiers laid down their lives in the service of the armies in
which they fought; but it is doubtful they viewed this as sacrifice in the emotional cause
of  a  watan,  or  an  inviolable  but  imperiled  motherland.1 Thus  the  emergence  of  this
strange love of the land—which had no precedent in earlier history, or could not have
been  said  to  spring  naturally  from  the  human  breast—is  an  interesting  historical
question. We have to provide an historical account of how something so utterly unnatural
became so utterly taken for granted. 
11 There  is  an  unnecessary  controversy  about  the  historical  sequence  of  the  relation
between the nation and the state; partly compounded by the fact that the nation is a
sentiment largely intangible, and the state is a complex of institutions that are relatively
easy to date with precision. It is correspondingly harder to decide when a sentiment of
nationalism arose, much easier to date a process of state formation. Ernest Gellner (2006)
contributed to this controversy by pointing out that although it is more reassuring to
nationalists to think that a sense of nationalism arose first and demanded and realized a
state, in fact, in European history generally sovereign states were formed by powerful
rulers, and within those increasingly sturdy containers, a single education system slowly
prepared a singular culture which self-celebrates its community as the nation. So there is
an—almost necessary—inversion between the imagined sequence of nation > state, and
the historical sequence of state > nation. The controversy was fuelled by his remark that
the ‘historical sense’ that accompanies nationalism is usually ‘fraudulent’, which showed
a glimpse of an excessively objectivist understanding of history. 
12 In  India,  historical  conditions  proved  more  complex,  giving  some  credence  to  both
sequences. I have argued elsewhere that the idea of India in a political sense was not a
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discovery as Nehru’s titled implied (2002 [1946]), but an invention of the 19th century. It
required  as  a  condition  the  firm  control  over  territories  that  British  colonial  rule
established  over  the  Indian  subcontinent,  though the  concertina  effect  continued  in
territories that lay in the North-East, Burma, and North-West of the empire. Subjection to
an  identical  administrative  and  political  system  of  sovereignty  was  reflected  in  the
creation  of  a  common  education  system  producing  similar  cultural  effects.  British
colonial discourse of course stressed the indispensability of the colonial frame for this
unity,  and claimed that  when this  iron frame was  removed,  ‘India’  would  fall  apart
reverting to  its  pre-modern plurality  of  political  units.  But  slowly the  experience of
common subjection to colonial rule produced a sentiment of resentment among Indians. I
have  argued  before  that  Bankimchandra  Chattopadhyay’s  (1838-1894)  literary  works
played a defining role in the coalescence of this sentiment. Drawing from three entirely
disjointed  discursive  traditions,  he  produced  the  defining  figure  of  the  Motherland
worshipped with a new kind of emotion of tremulous intensity in his song Vande Mataram
(1882). Pre-modern culture contained discrete discourses which celebrated the beauty of
nature,  illustrated  by  Kalidasa’s  (5th century C.E.)  poetry,  the  religious  traditions  of
worship of the figure of Shakti in the beneficent form of Durga or the avenging form of
Kali; and it also had purely mundane terms of desa or ksetra which referred emotionlessly
to physical space or territory reflected in Sanskrit terms like Kuruksetra (the territory of
the Kurus)  or  Sauviradesa  (the country of  the Sauviras)  which contained no affective
surplus beyond a simple physical reference. It is essential to point out, in analyzing this
mixture, that although the two other discourses had association of distinctive affects,
these were separate and unrelated. Kālidāsa’s nature poetry in the Meghaduta (‘The Cloud
Messenger’) or the Rtusamhara (‘A Round of Seasons’) exhibited a highly sophisticated
taste for literary presentation of nature—entirely literary, and entirely secular, without
any hint of religious devotion. It lacked any suggestion of people belonging to the land or
the land to the people.  The devotional  attitude towards Shakti—though intense—had
nothing to do with a sense of space, territory, human inhabitance—not to speak of any
form of political belonging. Thus, it is true that these three separate discursive elements
existed in earlier culture; but Bankim’s combination of these three into a combustible
fusion was an entirely  innovative  literary act.  In the original  song itself  there is  an
innovative combination of redirection of worshipfulness towards the land. Now she is re-
imaged as Mother-land to whom the fierce devotion appropriate to the Mother-goddess
could be re-directed. The characteristics of this Mother are not the conventional godly
qualities of sustenance, protective power, kindness and affection; but natural features—
being endowed with ‘good’ water, ‘good’ fruits, cooled by the gentle breezes of spring,
greened  by  abundant  crops,  whitened  by  nights  of  the  full  moon,  ornamented  by
flowering trees—entirely ungrammatical qualities to attribute to a figure of traditional
Godliness.  The  traditional  Goddess  was—in  principle—a  protector  of  all  mankind,
particularly of those who have sought her protection. The new Motherland deity is a
fiercely parochial and partial goddess: she bestows her affection indiscriminately to all
her children; not to others. The second unusual feature is the resonating emphasis on the
inclusion of the population, her children, in herself, with a cascading repetition of large
numbers. This is not merely true of the original song, Vande Mataram; numerous imitative
compositions, which mirrored and multiplied this new sentiment, and quoted the phrase,
stressed the same numerical and aggregative impulse. A Tagore song, composed soon
after, went:2
Ek-i sutre bandhiyachi sahasra-ti man
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Ek-i kaje sanmpiyachi sahasra jivan
Vande Mataram Vande Mataram
We have stitched a thousand minds together in a single thread
We have devoted a thousand lives to a single (common) task
Vande Mataram, Vande Mataram.
13 Clearly, the song has succeeded in working an astonishing transformation: it is in the
process of converting a religious chant into a political slogan. 
14 After this first, founding moment, this new sentiment suddenly had acquired the initial
elements of an affective language; and as political nationalism started to expand, literary
productions in this  language multiplied exponentially,  with a wide range of  poets of
varying degrees of talent composing patriotic poetry. Audience response to this genre
tended to not be exacting: what readers and singer wanted was more the intensity of
patriotism  than  poetic  quality.  Within  a  surprisingly  short  time,  this  new  genre
developed an immense corpus. Two trends are notable in the further historical career of
nationalist poetry. First, Bankim’s original composition was intense in its language, but it
was not in every sense a poem of excess. It did not take long for nationalist poetry to find
the path of  exaggeration in celebration of  the collective self.  A song composed by a
contemporary  of  Rabindranath  Tagore  (1861-1941),  Dwijendra  Lal  Roy  (1863-1913),
declared India, accordingly, the finest place in the world—a staple of all nationalist poetic
tropes: 
Dhana dhanye pushpe bhara amader ei vasundhara
Ihar majhe ache desh ek sakal desher sera
Se je svapna diye tairi se desh smriti diye ghera.
In this bounteous earth, filled with wealth, food and flowers, 
There is land that is the finest of all: 
That land is made of dreams and bounded by memory.3 
15 Parallel  to  the  poetic  and  lyrical  elaboration  of  this  image  began  a  visual—iconic
figuration of the Motherland by various schools of paintings. In paintings too we find an
entirely  parallel  tendency  towards  excess  and  mood  of  suspended  violence  towards
others. The gradual centrality of the trope of invincibility and a capacity for violence
against  enemies  develops  through  an  interesting  process  which  requires  separate
elaboration. Initially, violence and brutality are seen as defining characteristics of the
images of others—the enemies, oppressors and aggressors against the peaceable nation.
Oppression  requires  rebellion,  injustice  requires  requital,  and  these  acts  presuppose
strength. Slowly, the Mother acquires features of violence to act against her assailants.
Through the constantly transactive dynamic between the literary and visual arts,  the
initial  visualization of  the figure of  the Motherland was portrayed by Abanindranath
Tagore of the Bengal School. Influenced by techniques of Japanese painting, this early
figure came out as ethereal, non-violent, carrying the associations of beneficence from
the literary depiction by Bankim, entirely subtracting the militant, potentially violent
features.  As  the  visual  image  became  more  popular,  it  tended  to  incorporate  more
pronounced iconic  features  of  Hindu martial  goddesses,  often  riding  an  animal  as  a
vahana (a deity’s vehicle or mount), and her warlike characteristics were correspondingly
enhanced. In calendar art, which is a true mark of the popularization and simultaneous
banalization of an image, the figure is often superimposed on a geographic map of India,
and invested with features of grandeur and power—like an ostentatious crown and an
array of weapons in her arms.4 
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16 Patriotic poetry soon became common in all Indian vernaculars, with compositions from
a large number of political poets. Two of Tagore’s poems later became national anthems
for India and Bangladesh. Other major poets too composed patriotic songs, most famously
Mohammad Iqbal’s popular Tarana-i-Hindi [Anthem of the People of Hindustan; 1904]. Not
surprisingly, figures like Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966), the founder of modern
Hindu nationalism, also composed similar poems to express more intense forms of the
modern emotion. What was important in this wave of poetic composition was not the
quality of the poetry, but the ubiquity of the sentiment. Poetry is the specialized language
of  the  sacred,  almost  a  dialect  of  sacrality.  Prose  could  ordinarily  present  mere
arguments;  poetry  elicited  emotions.  The  nationalist  sacralization  of  the  land,  its
elevation, from a mundane expanse of material territory to the lyrical space to which
people could attach with an intense filial affect, was accomplished primarily by the shift
to  the  language  of  poetry  and  music.  Despite  the  music  and  the  poetry,  however,
nationalism remained a  deeply  political  project  with  all  the  attendant  difficulties  of
political power. Nationalist art expressed a dream of a nation, but in the colonial context,
it was a nation that dreamed of becoming free, in less lyrical translation—of becoming a
state. Thus this lyricism and poetry were always destined for eventual frustration, as
ultimately, when political independence arrived, nationalist politics became inescapably
involved in the deadly business of borders, and the finalist, decisive nationalist stamping
of people as citizens. Particularly the brutal reality of partition devastated the tranquil
symmetries of the lyrical idyll,  and replaced it by a ferocious scramble for land. In a
supreme irony, territorial divisions were often ultimately decided by low-level British
officials untouched by the poetry of emotional inhabitance. Political reality made an utter
mess of earlier dreams. Iqbal’s sare jahan se accha celebrated Hindustan hamara [better than
the entire world is our India], though he later advocated a separate state of Pakistan,
though the song continued to resound with the lines: mazhab nahi sikhata apas me bair
rakhna [faith does not teach us to bear enmity towards each other]. Tagore’s Jana gana
mana [Thou Art the Ruler of the Minds of All People, 1911], eventually the Indian anthem,
included Sindhu,  which incongruously  formed an integral  part  of  Pakistan.  Even the
bucolic invocation of Bengal in sarthaka janama amar janmechi ei deshe [blessed is this life
that I have been born in this land] is troubled by the division of ‘my Golden Bengal’ being
cut into two states. Dreams of a nationalist future and the reality of independent states
collided without any resolution. Understandably, all states in the region set to the task of
creating  appropriate  vehicles  for  their  new  politically  inviolate  territories  by
commissioning new poetry or editing old ones. Interestingly, in both India and Pakistan,
songs to extol the sacrifices of martyrs in the repeated wars were composed—but these
enjoyed more transient and fragile popularity. The spontaneous connection that dreams
and  poetry  had  with  the  futuristic  nation  could  hardly  be  established  with  the
institutional materiality of successor states. 
 
Vestigial presence of the pre-modern
17 Even in the period of high nationalism, there existed strands of thinking that were often
sharply critical of militant patriotism. Authors have already noted that two of the great
figures of Indian nationalism, Tagore and Gandhi, were deeply mistrustful of nationalist
sentiment, as they observed development of nationalist paranoia in Europe and its slide
into the utter inhumanity of warfare. Both men warned against an imitation of European-
style nationalism centered on the state. On the Islamic side, Iqbal was alarmed by the
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prospect  of  an  introduction  of  European-style  nationalism  in  India’s  highly  diverse
society; 5 and  warned  on  the  other  side  against  what  he  called  ‘Arab  imperialism’. 6
Alarmed by the strand of excess in Bengali patriotic poetry, Tagore began to compose
some  highly  uncharacteristic  ‘patriotic’  songs  which  deplored  the  nation’s  ability  to
overcome deep exclusions. For example, the poem Bharat-tirtha said: 
Rana-dhara bahi 
jay-gan gahi unmad kalarabe
Bhedi maru-path giri-parbat jara esechila sabe
Tara mor majhe sabi biraje keha nahe nahe dur
Amar sonite rayeche dhvanite tar-i bicitra sur
All those who came down the runnels of wars, 
chanting songs of victory, amidst an insane tumult, 
making their way through mountains and deserts, they all exist inside me, there is
not one who is distant; 
My blood throbs/resonates with the rich music of their diversity] (translation by
the author). 
18 In the 19th and early 20th centuries, a particular strand of nationalists began to argue that
there  was  a  long-term tendency  in  Indian  history  towards  ‘unity  in  diversity’.  This
became, for understandable reasons, the state ideology of post-independent India, and
degenerated  inevitably  into  a  cliché.  For  equally  understandable  reasons,  initially
Pakistan presented a self-image of a more united, homogeneous nation of South Asian
Muslims. But the stubborn fact of the sociology of diversity against the integrationist
demands of the modern state has remained an imaginative difficulty for both states. In
both  cases  the  actual  politics  of  the  everyday  have  deployed  two  kinds  of  political
resources to deal with the problem of identity. State-nationalism everywhere is a daily
referendum: so states need techniques by which they remind and exhort individuals to
organize their identity-attributes in the ‘right way’, giving privilege to their attribute of
citizenship, placing that identity-mark above everything. Despite the existence of explicit
state institutions that emphasize citizenship,  in actual  social  life both politicians and
ordinary  people  depend  on  and  return  to  the  repertoire  of  graded  connection  and
neighborliness  inherited  from a  very  long  pre-modern  tradition.  We  could  probably
advance a stronger argument. Through long periods of experimentation in Indian history,
through a  social  learning process,  empire states  fashioned a  logic  of  accommodative
relation between political  power and popular identities.  Empire-states were primarily
based on a logic of subsumption,7 allowing both identities and authority at a higher spatial
scale to subsume those at lower levels. The Mughal Empire, the last instance of a pre-
modern empire-state in South Asia, exhibited this logic in its states practices, and often,
in public debates and statements, its leading figures sought to articulate a theory of this
structure. Colonial history presented a fundamentally different model of the European
nation-state  to  the  imagination  of  local  elites.  Familiarity  and  desire  for  the  quite
different European model of sovereign nation-states instigated sections of these political
elites to try to emulate that structure, based on the logic of sovereignty and cultural
homogeneity.  Conceptions  of  radical  modernism in  India,  and of  an  Islamic  state  in
Pakistan and Bangladesh have periodically mobilized that utopia of sovereignty. In actual
political and social life, people depend much more on long-standing traditions of cultural
pluralism—which  deploys  the  pre-modern  techniques  of  graded  similarity  and
neighborliness. Social peace in the existing states of South Asia depends on practices of
everyday life drawn from pre-modern times to a much greater degree than we ordinarily
admit.
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The ideas of South Asia
Statist conceptions
19 I would like to turn briefly to the ‘idea’ of South Asia and its discontents. The idea of
‘South Asia’ exists today in two very different versions. As academics we are familiar with
an academic conception of South Asia which emerged typically in the 1950s American
academia, driven by the requirements of US foreign policy in the postwar world. This
optic  aggregated spaces  from a  geopolitical  point  of  view,  disregarding political  and
cultural differences—which may be significant for their inhabitants, but unimportant for
the framing of American strategy. There is considerable literature on the history of this
notion which shows how a term prompted by military calculation slowly morphed into a
respectable  disciplinary  entity  in  academic  scholarship.  Gradually  its  geopolitical
connotation was replaced by a different content, as postcolonial states grew and required
more  serious  academic  scrutiny.  There  was  a  concern  to  avoid  study  of  the  region
exclusively centered on India, or one of the other post-colonial states. I am skeptical of
the cognitive advantages of this move—whether study of India as part of a South Asian
department substantially changes how scholars perceive the object of their enquiry. It
should encourage more comparative research; but comparative analysis is plagued by an
ambiguity in its self-definition. There is still a great deal of uncertainty about whether
the starting point should be the historic similarity of the societies or the dissimilarities of
their contemporary political systems.8
20 An entirely different approach to a pragmatic conception of South Asia could be found in
the  tentative,  intermittent  attempts  by  the  states  to  gingerly  approach proposals  of
regional cooperation—on the lines of European integration. There are obvious arguments
for  the  advantages  of  economic  and market  integration,  or  educational  and cultural
exchange,  and  the  possibility  that  establishment  of  such  connections  and
interdependencies  might  reduce  political  tension.  These  initiatives  have  stuttered
through the recent decades, and have been plagued by anxieties about Indian dominance.
Compared to the relative successes of Europe, South Asia has failed to evolve even a
prosaic idea of political convenience. 
 
Evading the states
21 These disappointments are inherently related to a statist perspective on identity. We are
forced to reflect on the immensity of transformation that modern politics has brought to
the way people cognize and practice space. Through its long history what we now can call
‘South Asia’ was a space that was intimately recognized, but formally unnamed. It was a
vast  expanse which contained hundreds  of  political  formations  in  which neither  the
states  made  exclusive  claims  on  its  subjects,  nor  did  the  people  on  their  states.
Technology made it hard to move easily; and oppressive social structures often made
mobility impossible. But the political regimes did not act like containers or cages. Borders
were shifting, ineffective and porous. It is remarkable how the power of the modern state
—which can use a form of violence that is implicit, not obvious – has created containers
for identity and effective circulation of political acts,  of economic goods and cultural
goods. State boundaries have made two cities like Lahore and Amritsar, separated by a
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few  miles,  much  more  distant  than  Kolkata  and  Chennai.  Under  modern  political
conditions, it is exceptionally hard to evade the state.
22 Yet, it can be argued that, as an historical project, in some ways the containerization of
singularized state identities in our region has not entirely succeeded. This is true in at
least two ways. First, the creation of the states of India and Pakistan has not successfully
erased the identity pluralities of previous history. States have been forced to different
degrees to come to terms with internal pluralism. Second, in many respects, the pre-
modern  disjunction  between  different  kinds  of  spatiality—of  politics,  economic
connections, cultures and literary public spheres—has survived. Identities have remained
stubbornly plural, and attempts to force them into a single stable hierarchy sanctioned by
the state failed. Commerce notoriously evades political control. The difficulty of policing
the Bangladesh-India border is  that there is  an underlying economic regionality that
crosses  the  boundary.  Laborers  cross  borders  driven  by  economic  incentives.  The
populations of these states have historical cultural commonalities. Urdu literary culture
straddles the boundary between Pakistan and India; just as Bengali culture does between
India  and  Bangladesh.  Different  socialities  of  space  find  ways  of  evading  the  brutal
enforcement of state borders. State borders and efforts at containerization are frustrated
as much by historical forces as by forces of the future. Globalization processes have added
to the difficulty of maintaining the boundaries as the impermeable limits of all forms of
activity. Still, there is no denying of the dominance of states and borders in contemporary
political practice. It is highly unlikely that there will be a tarana9 for South Asia as a
poetically felt space in the near future. But if we go back to the initial argument about
two senses of space and inhabitance, we can observe a robust presence not of a modern
South Asia created by the collaboration of states, but of a vestigial pre-modern South Asia
present in social transactions.
23 Let me illustrate this by a Tariq Ali’s interview. In an interview on Al-Jazeera television he
was  asked  to  recount  his  long  experience  of  living  in  Britain,  and  the  interviewer
questioned him particularly about hardships on first arriving in England. He answered
that he was revolted by the food served in college; and remarked to someone that ‘we do
not serve food of this sort even to animals back in our place’. This sense of ‘our place’ was
not merely vivid but real. It was not an act of memory; but also a reference to the present,
not just a remark about culinary taste. Historians like Braudel have noted that material
cultures have the longest temporal rhythms, and are the hardest to shift. It is amusing
how  the  powers  of  the  state  have  been  ineffective  in  partitioning  material  life,
particularly aspects like cuisine—which represents one of the fundamental ways in which
humans interact with nature. Despite the inflamed and militarized frontier between our
two countries,  any  culinarily  un-cosmopolitan  Indian  would  immediately  understand
what Tariq Ali meant and sympathize. Theorists have neglected to notice that food, as
much as commerce,  tends to seep out under the boundaries of  states.  Movements of
culinary taste have proved impossible to control by stringent rules of immigration. When
students arrive in alien cultures,  they always tend to congregate along these lines of
common culture. Commercial centers like Southall in London or Gare du Nord in Paris
stand witness to the shared material cultures of South Asian peoples. Remarkably, when
states  do  not  intervene,  cultural  commonality  tends  to  reassert  itself.  Isolated  in  a
surrounding  culture  which  ignores  or  devalues  them,  South  Asians  rediscover  their
shared relation to the natural world. Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1827-1894), a 19th century
Bengali social theorist, argued that in people who live in the same material world history
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produces strong filaments of samaduhkhasukhata—identical experience of pleasure and
pain. Of course, this was a travesty of the term’s original meaning in the Gita,  which
exhorted wise people (the sthitaprajna) to consider pleasure and pain as identical. But its
new meaning—in Bhudev’s hand—captures something vital in historical experience—to
travelers  from  the  subcontinent  (which  is  our  embarrassed  word  for  invoking  the
continued presence of this pre-modern historical space) Southall cuisine produces delight
and British food despair. Culture has ways of escaping the invigilation by states, and of
creeping out of the containers of modern power. If we can overcome the comprehensive
devaluation of all things pre-modern, we could become less embarrassed in celebrating
these connections—which are real and deeply felt, though unlike nationalism, they lack
the endorsement  of  magnificent  poetry.  Though it  is  possible  to  suggest  that  in the
sincere appreciation of ‘classical music’, sung often through the words of medieval poets
like  Kabir,  we  still  have  an  equally  powerful  poetic  celebration  of  pre-modern
neighborliness. In those words, and in the wordless expressivity of instrumental music,
we may have the half-forgotten anthems of a wistful common culture of the space called
South Asia. 
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NOTES
1. Despite the anachronistic poetic redeployment of Rana Pratap or Shivaji in the cause of Hindu
nationalist history.
2. Rabindranath  Thakur,  Gitabitan [ Akhanda],  Visvabharati,  Kolkata,  1970,  818:  the  section  is
appropriately called Jatiya Sangit (Songs of the Nation).
3. Dwijendra Lal Roy also composed intense nationalist plays like Mebar Patan (Fall of Mewar).
4. See Christopher Pinney (2004) and Patricia Uberoi (2006) on calendar art.
5. See Iqbal’s speech to the Muslim League conference in Allahabad in 1930.
6. Iqbal (2013 [1930]). 
7. See for the extended argument about subsumption, Sudipta Kaviraj (2003). 
8. It is common to emphasize the political differences between India and the other South Asian
societies; but a different argument can be found in Ayesha Jalal (1995). 
9. Like Iqbal’s Tarana-i-Hindi (see above). 
ABSTRACTS
In this paper I shall try to explore how the idea of space in what we call ‘South Asia’ today got
reconfigured by modernity.  I  shall  explore three spatial conceptions of South Asia—strategic,
geographic and cultural; and I shall try to explain the patterns of space-thinking underlying each
one of them, show their connection with modernity, and observe why and how South Asia is still
not a space that can be conceived in nationalistic or state terms as a space of belonging.  Two
political processes of modernity introduce a new kind of space-making—nationalism and state-
formation.  In  the  paper,  I  shall  follow  some  significant  points  of  this  dual  process—of  the
emergence of new state structures—of British colonial India—and its animation of the rise of
variant  forms  of  nationalism—in  19th century  Bengal,  in  the  Islamic  imagination  of  the  20 th
century,  and  eventually  through  the  institution  of  state-nationalisms  in  India,  Pakistan  and
Bangladesh. These state forms and gestalts of affect make it impossible to think of South Asia as a
space of emotional inhabitance—like India or Pakistan. Yet, despite this state-nationalist borders
of  consciousness,  there  still  exist  long-term  historical  commonalities  which  people
spontaneously practice and enjoy—in food, material culture, literature, art, music—which have a
deep and long history. This marks peoples of this region (not states) by a common intelligibility
which  is  reflected  in  their  easy  commingling  when  outside  their  countries,  and  free  of  the
pressures of state nationalism, or in artistic public spheres. 
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